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Sander Gilman has done a great deal to awaken medical historians to the value ofpictorial
evidence. His studies of the iconography of madness and Hugh W. Diamond's photography
havebroughtabroadcultural-historical perspective toimagespreviously open onlyto narrower
interpretations. Some of the earlier madness studies are more or less replicated in this new
collection, Disease andrepresentation, including essays on Charles Dickens and the asylum, the
paintings of Richard Dadd and van Gogh, and Charles Darwin's use of the photograph.
Anotherearlierstudy, the image oftheAIDSpatient, also reappears. The newmaterial includes
an analysis of Leonardo's famous drawing ofcoition. In each ofthese studies the presence of
Gilman'sinventivemindisunavoidable. Hedartshereandthere,coveringcontinentsandaeons,
rewarding the reader with valuable insights and new sidelights on familiar and unfamiliar
material. In the first chapter, also new, Gilman attempts to give coherence to the whole
collection by presenting a theory of "representing illness".
The inclusion ofthis chapter was a mistake. Instead ofdelivering a coherent approach to the
iconography of disease it offers conjecture, unsubstantiated assertion, and psychoanalytical
mumbo-jumbo as a substitute for a theory ofthe social place ofimages. The footnotes contain
only the most meagre references to current innovative work in art history and the sociology of
knowledge, yetthisiswhatthechapterisostensibly about. In it, Gilman declares his hostility to
social constructivist approaches to history and also reveals his failure to understand them.
" 'Madness' ", hewrites, (the book sports a luxuriant growth ofquotation marks), "is often the
test case for those who claim that there is nothing but the social construction ofdisease, that
thesemodelsofmentalillnessexistindependentofanyreality.Theybelievethatnosuchentityas
mental illness exists" (p. 9). For a work claiming to be a contribution to cognitive theory this is
anunfortunatemisunderstanding. Socialconstructivistsarguethattheyhavethebestofreasons
forassertingthatmentalillnessexistsasanentity. Oursocietyholdsit to bethecasethatitexists,
and indeed demonstrates its existence in myriad ways every day.
The origin ofGilman's misunderstanding is apparent: he has conflated the radical sociology
of knowledge and current anti-psychiatric literature. Modern social constructivism argues, in
brief, thatall knowledgeclaimsare to betreated asequalbytheanalystand, in oneversion, that
all suchclaims(includingclaimsaboutnature) are to beregarded as resolvable into problems of
socialorder. Mostanti-psychiatricliterature, however, hasitsorigins intheeverydaytheoryand
practice ofpsychiatry. From thisdirection come such figures asThomas Szasz and R. D. Laing,
whomGilmancites, whospecificallycomparewhattheyregard asunrealmentalillnesswithreal
physical illness. For the social constructivist, however, schizophrenia is every bit as real as
tuberculosis.
Gilman's mistake leads him into a hopeless attempt to distinguish between "real" and
"imaginary", or "invented" diseases (the quotation marks are all his). The ground on which he
makes this distinction, however, are never explicitly discussed: he never tells us in what way
masturbatory insanity differs from "real" insanity, except that it is not real. He includes,
however, anapproving reference to "competent medical knowledge", as opposed to the "world
of myth which corrupts the language of science" (p. 16). In other words, when he chooses,
Gilman invokes scientific authority as a source oftrustworthy judgements, although on what
grounds he does not say.
In the second chapter, 'Madness and representation', Gilman returns to this problem, noting
that after World War II such writers "as Thomas Szasz and R. D. Laing began to see mental
illness as an artifact of society" (pp. 18-19). Now this is not analysis or even competent
description, rather it is sloppiness. Mental illness must be an artifact of society, even if, as
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Gilman appears to argue, it is something else as well. Gilman contrasts this view with what he
representsasitsopposite, the"illusion thatmentalillnessissimplyanartifactofbiology"(p. 19).
The word "artifact" gives rise to interpretive problems with this sentence but I take it to mean a
classofbehaviouridentified asdistinctbybiologists. Although, byhisowndeclaration, heought
to accept thelatter as "competent medical knowledge", Gilmanargues that "Both views ignore
the fact that the idea ofmental illness structures both the perception ofdisease and its form"
(p. 19). The meaning of this contorted assertion is unclear. It implies the existence of four
entities-mental illness, an idea ofmental illness, a subsequent perception ofmental illness and
something else called its "form". Quite what this thing called mental illness is, which isdifferent
from ideas and perceptions of it, is never explained.
Gilman follows this distinctionwith an illustration of"thismixtureofthe 'seeing' ofanillness
and its reality" (which was not, in fact, quite the point he had made) (p. 19). Inthe Middle Ages,
he writes,
The illness melancholywas viewed as a result ofthe imbalance ofthehumors, black bile, amythic
entity dominated the melancholic. The female is perceived as being especially prone to the
exaggeration ofemotional states ... when male characters in themedieval epic were portrayed as
melancholic, they were given passive, "female" characteristics (p. 19).
But innone ofthis orwhatfollowsisthere anyattemptto tellusabout a "reality" ofmelancholia
in the Middle Ages distinct from designations and perceptions ofit, and therepresentations ofit
by those designated as melancholic.
These various ontological confusions and sociological misunderstandings however are more
comprehensible than the psychoanalytical gobbledegook with which Gilman underpins them.
Images of disease, Gilman argues, are contaminated by "fear of collapse, the sense of
dissolution". Thus "we project this fear onto the world" with the result that "it is not we who
totter on the brink ofcollapse but rather the Other" (p. 1). Now the capitalized "Other" turns
out to be Gilman's most valuable tool in avoiding engagement with alternative scholarship.
Generically related to this "Other" is another "Other", this time called "mother". He writes,
"The basic structure ... ofall stereotyping [is] the inherent and universal fantasy made between
the 'good' 'mother' (whom we can control) and the 'bad' 'mother' (who lies outside of our
potential for control)" (p. 4). These various "Others" and "mothers" all amount to rhetorical
variations onthat most bankrupt ofall explanatory devices, need. Conventional representations
of madness point toward "the need of society to identify the mad absolutely" (p. 48). In the
Renaissance "A newmyth arose out ofthe need tocontain the mentally ill" (p. 22). Occasionally,
Gilman offers a promising suggestion about how these needs might be explained in social terms.
Thus, on medieval representations of the body, he notes that "anatomists needed to create a
boundary between the urine, which was viewed as polluting, and the semen, the source ofa new
soul" (p. 55). Instead of reverting to his varieties of "Other" to explain this "need", Gilman
argues that this convention "was a boundary between the material and the spiritual" (p. 55), an
insight which suggests an analysis of medieval iconography in terms of clerical and lay
distinctions in medieval society. Such historical conjectures, however, are rare, by contrast with
such explanatory offerings as the "need for coherence" (p. 63) and "our inner fear of our own
stability" (p. 86).
Gilman's lack ofany coherent iconographic theory reveals itselfin his analysis ofparticular
pictures: many of the detailed studies mirror the muddled thinking of the first two chapters.
Visual representations are like printed texts. They were made by particular conventions, they
were produced to circulate among certain audiences, they have been employed for various ends
often unintended by their makers. Many ofthese things the historian can know after examining
otherdocuments, such as letters and manuscripts. In the absence ofacomplete range ofsources,
the historian might be forced to guess, to make a suggestion.
The problem is that Gilman makes up stories about pictures without indicating where the
evidence starts and stops. Take, for example, his analysis of the famous Leonardo drawing
"depicting human sexuality" (p. 52-actually, human sexual intercourse). Leonardo, according
to Gilman, wrote on the sheet, "How are the testicles the cause of ardour?" (p. 56); Gilman,
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following Kenneth Keele, explains that Leonardo was illustrating Plato's Timaeus, but then
claims that Leonardo was illustrating Plato's account that it is the semen in the testes which
makes the male organs ofgeneration disobedient, "an animal within" (p. 56). This is in fact a
conjecture for which there is no warrant in the drawing or associated texts: what Leonardo
actually wrote was, "Note what the testicles have to do with the coition and the sperm".
Leonardo also appended the note, "By means of these figures the causes of many ulcers and
diseases will be demonstrated". This, says Gilman, "points" to the yet-unnamed new disease
syphilis and "records the tell-tale signs of the illness, the genital ulcers that are its most
prominent feature" (p. 56). Once again there is no evidence for this conjecture, which also
ignores the historical problem that for two decades after its appearance syphilis was not
perceived as a characteristically genital disease. Nor are we offered any evidence for the
argument that with the male figure's "cascade ofhair Leonardo is pointing to the image ofthe
syphilitic" (p. 57). Indicating, as Gilman does, Albrecht Diirer's syphilitic with long hair, ofat
least twoyearslater, hardlyconstitutesevidence. HowdoesGilman knowthat bothartists were
not following another convention? Many other images ofyoung men (including Christ) show
them with long hair.
On the same sheet, there are two views of the penis-longitudinal and transverse-and a
hemisected human abdomen with the alimentary canal of an animal. The image of the
longitudinal penis, Gilman remarks, "erect and functioning quite independent ofany external
control, is represented as an autonomous force" (p. 58). But Leonardo illustrates practically
every other organ ofthe body on its own: why is this different? Next, Gilman tells us that the
juxtapositionofpenis and thehuman torsowith theanimal gutsmeans that themalememberis
"posed for entrance" (p. 59), that the conjunction of bestial anatomy and the penis signifies
homosexuality. There are a number ofpoints here. One, this would not be homosexuality but
sodomy. Two, at this point in his career Leonardo had only animal digestive tracts available to
himasmodelsforthehuman type. Three, whydid Leonardo simply notrepresent theforbidden
act? These were, after all, his private notebooks. Four, why does Gilman give the sexual
drawings special treatment? Nearly all Leonardo's anatomical sheets have numerous isolated
representationsandjuxtaposedorgans.TheproblemisthatGilmanhasdecidedonastorycalled
"Leonardo . . . understands his own otherness" (p. 62) and batters the evidence to fit. But to
criticize him on these ground is in fact to concede the viability ofthe project. Is it credible that
anyone can know what went on inside the head of a fifteenth-century Florentine?
The paper 'Seeing the AIDS patient' reveals similar problems. It contains a photograph
captioned"theAIDSpatientbeingexaminedbyhisphysicians" (p. 259). Inthispicture,Gilman
tellsus,"Thephysicalsenseofdistanceispalpable;theobserversareasfarawayfromthepatient
as they can be without being in another room" (p. 258). That is Gilman's story and he can
constrain us to read that story in the picture by bombarding us with information about "the
mortally affected and infecting patient suffering a morally repugnant disease" (p. 258). But the
meaning is not in the picture; the naive observer could make up a whole range ofother stories
about what's going on here. Nowhere in Gilman's text is it clear that he understands this. The
nearest we get is the opaque,
Althoughthisisa"typical"imageofmedicaltreatment, in...photographsofphysiciansatwork,
the ground provided for the observer of the image is the tension communicated-not by the
treatment ofthe patient-but by the implications associated with the patient's disease (p. 258).
In a work that purports to be a new contribution to cognitive theory, this is just not good
enough. IfGilman cannotmake the simplest points clearly then he cannot expect his readers to
have patience. Come off it Sander, pull the "other" one.
Christopher Lawrence, Wellcome Institute
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